Source or prior law:

L. 1911, ch. 218, § 11; L. 1913, ch. 216, § 5; L. 1917, ch. 226, § 3; R.S. 1923, 44-510.

Law Review and Bar Journal References:

"Workers Compensation Review," Patrick R. Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 24, No. 1, 19 (2000).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 24, No. 5, 23 (2001).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 24, No. 6, 22 (2001).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 25, No. 1, 24 (2001).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 25, No. 2, 21, 23 (2001).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 25, No. 3, 17, 18 (2002).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 5, 18 (2003).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 3, 25 (2004).

"The Immunity Provisions in the Kansas Tort Claims Act: The First Twenty-Five Years," William E. Westerbeke, 52 K.L.R. 939 (2004).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 6, 19 (2004).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 28, No. 4, 24 (2005).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 5, 15 (2007).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 6, 25 (2007).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 31, No. 4, 29 (2008).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 31, No. 5, 18 (2008).

"2011 Amendments to the Kansas Workers Compensation Act in Light of Bergstrom v. Spears Manufacturing Company," Sara Gold, 21 Kan. J. L. & Pub Pol'y, No. 2, 239 (2012).

CASE ANNOTATIONS

Explanation, see Revisor's Note under article title, chapter 44, article 5.

Cases through 1973

MEDICAL CARE

—In general (1-10)

1. Payment of hospital charges; execution stayed until charges paid. Gadberry v. Egg Case Filler Co., 104 Kan. 72, 76, 177 P. 834 (1919).

2. Liability of employer to employee for medical care is based on the contract of employment which includes provisions of act. Johnson v. Skelly Oil Co., 180 Kan. 275, 281, 303 P.2d 172 (1956).

3. Furnishing of medical aid to workman constitutes payment of compensation within meaning of act. Owen v. Ready Made Buildings, Inc., 180 Kan. 286, 288, 303 P.2d 168 (1956).

4. One of the primary duties of employer is to furnish medical, surgical and hospital treatment to workmen. Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130, 135, 379 P.2d 217 (1963).

5. Medical expense limitation increased by amendment of statute after accident; amount before amendment is controlling. Johnson v. Warren, 192 Kan. 310, 314, 387 P.2d 213 (1963).

6. 1961 amendment not controlling over injury sustained in 1960; act substantive, not procedural. Johnson v. Warren, 192 Kan. 310, 311, 313, 387 P.2d 213 (1963).

7. Award made under subsection (1); substitution of parties. Kansas Physicians' Service v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 196 Kan. 204, 206, 409 P.2d 991 (1966).

8. Liability for medical expenses is limited, not fixed award. Walker v. Davis Van & Storage Co., 198 Kan. 452, 456, 457, 424 P.2d 473 (1967).

9. Cited in considering authority of district court to determine application for lump sum award. Johnson v. General Motors Corporation, 199 Kan. 720, 723, 726, 433 P.2d 585 (1967).

10. Deposition fee of examining doctor does not constitute a charge for medical treatment. McDowell v. Paynter, 202 Kan. 767, 770, 451 P.2d 227 (1969).

—Purpose of treatment (11-15)

11. Testimony that treatment would be beneficial and lack of treatment would extend disability supports judgment for future medical care. Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 366, 139 P.2d 846 (1943).

12. Medical care expense authorized for treatment of mental condition caused or aggravated by compensable accident. Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 366, 139 P.2d 846 (1943).

13. Future medical expense may be allowed for treatment to rehabilitate workman; respondents retain right to question reasonableness of treatment and expense therefor. Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 366, 139 P.2d 846 (1943).

14. Medical treatment authorized for purpose of reducing unsightliness of scar. Harris v. Bechtel-Dempsey-Price, 160 Kan. 560, 562, 565, 164 P.2d 89 (1945).

15. Award for future medical treatment upheld; employer may therefor question necessity and reasonableness. Jones v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 165 Kan. 1, 3, 9, 192 P.2d 141 (1948).

—Reasonable charges (16-18)

16. Statute contemplates that what is reasonable compensation for medical services shall be shown by evidence. Orozco v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 121 Kan. 690, 692, 249 P. 604 (1926).

17. Physician's charges not limited by act when employer requests services. Ross v. Austin Drilling Co., 131 Kan. 824, 825, 293 P. 757 (1930).

18. Employer held liable for reasonable expenses, although not expressly requested before incurred. Kauffman v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 170 Kan. 325, 331, 225 P.2d 129 (1950).

—Neglect to provide care (19-21)

19. Employee's procurement of own medical services not compensation payment; 44-520a not tolled. Solorio v. Wilson & Co., 161 Kan. 518, 519, 521, 524, 169 P.2d 822 (1946).

20. When employer neglects to provide medical care and injured workman pays for the medical care himself, the workman can recover compensation therefor, even if he has also recovered therefor from another source. Babcock v. Dose, 178 Kan. 700, 705, 290 P.2d 1046 (1955).

21. Under facts, employer held to have "neglected to reasonably provide" medical benefits; employer is liable for medical care procured by claimant. Cross v. Wichita Compressed Steel Co., 187 Kan. 344, 348, 349, 356 P.2d 804 (1960).

—Claimant's doctor's expense (22-23)

22. Medical examination to evaluate disability does not constitute medical treatment; limitation statute for filing claim not tolled. (Three specially concurring opinions and one partial dissent.) Thompson v. Swenson Construction Co., 158 Kan. 49, 53, 56, 57, 58, 145 P.2d 166 (1944).

23. Medical examinations made solely to evaluate claim and to obtain testimony on behalf of claimant need not be paid for by respondent. Fisher v. Rhoades Construction Co., 190 Kan. 448, 453, 375 P.2d 771 (1962); rehearing denied, 190 Kan. 633, 375 P.2d 771 (1962).

DEATH CASES, WHOLLY DEPENDENT

—In general (24-27)

24. Right to full compensation vests on death of workman. Smith v. Boiler Works Co., 104 Kan. 591, 593, 180 P. 259 (1919).

25. Amount due on death claim is immediately ascertainable by employer. Johnson, Guardian, v. Milling Co., 116 Kan. 731, 734, 229 P. 359 (1924).

26. Compensation under subsection (2) (a) is to be based upon and under the contract in force and effect at the time of the accident resulting in death. Dean v. Hodges Bros., 170 Kan. 333, 337, 224 P.2d 1028 (1950).

27. Amounts of compensation awarded determined by law in effect on date of the employee's injuries. Geurian v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 192 Kan. 589, 601, 389 P.2d 782 (1964).

—Definition of terms (28-30)

28. "Wholly dependent" means full, complete dependence; no means other than earnings of workman. McCormick et al. v. Coal & Coke Co., 117 Kan. 686, 690, 232 P. 1071 (1925).

29. A person is wholly dependent when his support is derived wholly from the workman's wages; partly dependent when support is derived in part from that source and in part from some other. Michael v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 120 Kan. 684, 686, 244 P. 1050 (1926).

30. "Wholly dependent" and "partly dependent" defined. Proffitt v. Aldridge, 154 Kan. 468, 474, 119 P.2d 523 (1941).

—Computation of award (31-32)

31. Wholly dependent widow; amount of award. McCracken v. Bridge Co., 96 Kan. 353, 354, 355, 150 P. 832 (1915); modified, 96 Kan. 799, 153 P. 525 (1915).

32. Death of workman employed less than year; computation of earnings. Miles v. Wyatt, 138 Kan. 863, 865, 28 P.2d 748 (1934).

—Parents and wife (33-35)

33. The question of whether claimants (parents of workman) were dependent on deceased was one of fact. Junkin v. Acme Foundry & Machine Co., 145 Kan. 234, 236, 65 P.2d 263 (1937).

34. Parents wholly dependent upon workman's earnings; degree of dependency is to be determined as of date of the accident. Dean v. Hodges Bros., 170 Kan. 333, 336, 224 P.2d 1028 (1950). Proffitt v. Aldridge, 154 Kan. 468, 119 P.2d 523 (1941).

35. Fact wife owned home did not prevent finding she was wholly dependent. Shobe v. Tobin Construction Co., 179 Kan. 43, 48, 292 P.2d 729 (1956).

—Deduction of prior payments (36-38)

36. Allowance for medical services error where workman dies from injuries; act since amended. Wyant v. Douglas Coal Co., 122 Kan. 469, 473, 252 P. 237 (1927).

37. Settlement of claim is no bar to claim by dependents after death of workman; however, all payments (except medical) are deductible. Routh v. List & Weatherly Construction Co., 124 Kan. 222, 227, 228, 229, 257 P. 721 (1927).

38. Right of action by workman is separate from right of dependents. Routh v. List & Weatherly Construction Co., 124 Kan. 222, 227, 228, 257 P. 721 (1927).

—No dependents (39)

39. Provision in 1917 act limiting liability to alien dependent unconstitutional and void; effect of international treaty. Vietti v. Fuel Co., 109 Kan. 179, 180, 181, 197 P. 881 (1921).

—Minor child (40-41)

40. No error in trial court finding appellant not wholly dependent on decedent at time of accident. Richardson v. Robert Drummond Trucking, 204 Kan. 385, 387, 461 P.2d 754 (1969).

41. Cited; where parental rights have been terminated, child is not entitled to workmen's compensation benefits upon death of parent. Roelfs v. Wallingford, Inc., 207 Kan. 804, 808, 486 P.2d 1371 (1971).

DEATH CASES, PARTIALLY DEPENDENT

—Computation for wife (42-44)

42. Workman earned $4,673.18 all of which was paid for support of himself, his wife and family; wife earned $1,892; partial dependency; award full amount under statute. Peterson v. Fairmont Food Co., 179 Kan. 799, 806, 298 P.2d 223 (1956); rehearing, 180 Kan. 271, 272, 302 P.2d 1001 (1956).

43. Formula for subsection (2)(b) after 1947, 1951 and 1953 amendments stated and applied in award to widow. Peterson v. Fairmont Food Co., 179 Kan. 799, 298 P.2d 223 (1956); rehearing, 180 Kan. 271, 302 P.2d 1001 (1956).

44. Wife working only partially dependent; husband contributed all his earnings to support himself and wife; same award as though wife totally dependent. Conklin v. Topeka Wholesale Grocery Co., 183 Kan. 458, 462, 327 P.2d 860 (1958).

—Computation for parents (45-50)

45. Mother held partly dependent upon son, under facts stated; legal obligation not proper test of dependency. Smith v. Sash & Door Co., 96 Kan. 816, 819, 153 P. 533 (1915).

46. Minor workman living at home and supporting family killed; in computing death benefit no deduction is made for board and room of the minor son. Slater v. Milling Co., 106 Kan. 772, 774, 189 P. 908, (1920).

47. Extent of dependence of mother, father and sister of workman determined; computation explained. Young v. Shellabarger Mill and Elevator Co., 123 Kan. 628, 630, 631, 256 P. 992 (1927).

48. Formula applied for computing death benefit award for partially dependent mother. Burgin v. Western Coal & M. Co., 135 Kan. 330, 331, 332, 10 P.2d 908 (1932).

49. No dependency where cost of maintenance of minor equaled contributions to parents. Spurgin v. Spurgin, 152 Kan. 212, 213, 220, 221, 103 P.2d 889 (1940).

50. Formula for partial dependency discussed and applied. Lees, Administrator v. White, 197 Kan. 118, 123, 124, 125, 415 P.2d 272 (1966).

—Proof and definition (51-56)

51. Dependency may exist although person supported by others. Smith v. Sash & Door Co., 96 Kan. 816, 818, 819, 153 P. 533 (1915).

52. "Partial dependence" defined; may vary from wholly dependent to wholly independent; degree of dependency is a question of fact. McCormick et al. v. Coal & Coke Co., 117 Kan. 686, 690, 232 P. 1071 (1925).

53. Computation of degree of partial dependency reviewed. Golden v. Wilson & Co., 129 Kan. 100, 104, 281 P. 860 (1929).

54. Claimant must prove what amount workman contributed during two years preceding injury; no evidence thereof in record; judgment for defendant affirmed. Lines v. Hudson Oil Co., 146 Kan. 143, 144, 68 P.2d 1096 (1937).

55. Computation of award held properly made. Baker v. Western Power & Light Co., 147 Kan. 571, 575, 78 P.2d 36 (1938).

56. Proper method of computing death benefits of partial dependent determined and explained; provision since amended. Kelly v. Lassen Hotel Co., 161 Kan. 444, 446, 447, 448, 168 P.2d 527 (1946).

—Minor child (57-58)

57. No error in trial court finding appellant not wholly dependent on decedent at time of accident. Richardson v. Robert Drummond Trucking, 204 Kan. 385, 387, 461 P.2d 754 (1969).

58. Cited; where parental rights have been terminated, child is not entitled to workmen's compensation benefits upon death of parent. Roelfs v. Wallingford, Inc., 207 Kan. 804, 808, 486 P.2d 1371 (1971).

DEATH CASES, APPORTIONMENT OF AWARD

—Degree of dependency (59-61)

59. Minor workman killed; degree of dependency of parents, and computation considered. Slater v. Milling Co., 106 Kan. 772, 774, 189 P. 908 (1920).

60. Question of degree of dependency is a question of fact in each case to be determined by director. Thomas v. Bone, 191 Kan. 453, 455, 381 P.2d 373 (1963).

61. Dependency is determined as of date of injury. Middleton v. National Compressed Steel Corp., 199 Kan. 574, 575, 431 P.2d 676 (1967).

—Apportionment, generally (62-64)

62. Compensation must be apportioned among dependents according to dependency. McCormick et al. v. Coal & Coke Co., 117 Kan. 686, 690, 232 P. 1071 (1925).

63. Employer cannot appeal from an apportionment among dependents wholly dependent, because it is a matter which does not concern him; see proviso 7*. McCormick et al. v. Coal & Coke Co., 117 Kan. 686, 692, 232 P. 1071 (1925).

64. Compensation is not limited to dependents in one class when there are dependents in another class of lesser degree of family relation. Winchester v. Stanton-Wallace Construction Co., 124 Kan. 458, 460, 260 P. 614 (1927).

—Particular cases (65-68)

65. Widow and child each apportioned $2000 as dependents; reversed as to widow on appeal; commissioner may reapportion all the $4000 to the child. Baxter v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rly. Co., 141 Kan. 527, 532, 41 P.2d 999 (1935).

66. Entire award granted to one dependent where other barred by statute of limitations. Brenn v. City of St. John, 149 Kan. 416, 421, 87 P.2d 546 (1939).

67. Two children by former marriage, as well as widow and her four children totally dependent on workman; all participate in award. Carrington v. British American Oil Producing Co., 157 Kan. 101, 106, 138 P.2d 463 (1943).

68. Apportionment of compensation made among three families of deceased workman. Peters v. Peters, 177 Kan. 100, 276 P.2d 302 (1954).

DEATH CASES, BURIAL, MARRIAGE AND MATURITY

—Burial expense (69-70)

69. Interest on award for burial expenses or any other part of award is not allowable. Woods v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 141 Kan. 363, 365, 41 P.2d 748 (1935); Modified, 141 Kan. 748, 43 P.2d 786 (1935).

70. Allowance for burial expenses must be based on evidence; burden of proof on claimant. Brenn v. City of St. John, 149 Kan. 416, 421, 422, 87 P.2d 546 (1939).

—Marriage (71-73)

71. Effect of addition of clause concerning marriage of dependent considered. Taylor v. Sulzberger & Sons Co., 98 Kan. 169, 170, 157 P. 435 (1916).

72. Clause relating to marriage or maturity of dependent has no application to death of dependent after death of workman. Smith v. Boiler Works Co., 104 Kan. 591, 593, 180 P. 259 (1919).

73. Meaning of word "affect" in clause (2)(d) is that it shall not affect that class injuriously. McCormick et al. v. Coal & Coke Co., 117 Kan. 686, 693, 694, 232 P. 1071 (1925).

—Maturity (74-76)

74. When compensation to dependent minor continued after reaching eighteen considered. Taylor v. Sulzberger & Sons Co., 98 Kan. 169, 157 P. 435 (1916).

75. Adult married son held not a dependent. Taylor v. Sulzberger & Sons Co., 98 Kan. 169, 173, 157 P. 435 (1916).

76. Thirty-year-old invalid brother could be a "dependent"; upon his recovery compensation is terminated. Dunnigan v. Coal Co., 115 Kan. 57, 60, 222 P. 109, 110 (1924).

INJURY NOT FATAL

—Total permanent disability (77-82)

77. Compensation determined where previous disability coupled with later injury caused total permanent disability; workman blind in one eye loses other eye; 415 weeks less 110 weeks. Stevens v. Kelly-Carter Coal Co., 140 Kan. 441, 442, 37 P.2d 48 (1934).

78. Workman industrially blind in one eye, loses the other eye by injury; total disability; compensation for total minus schedule for one eye. Masoner v. Wilson & Co., 141 Kan. 882, 884, 44 P.2d 265 (1935).

79. Workman sustained injury for which scheduled compensation is payable; in same accident sustained other injuries; combined injuries may totally incapacitate. Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 Kan. 790, 792, 62 P.2d 920 (1936).

80. Evidence of claimant's back injury and incapacity therefrom held sufficient to support finding of total permanent disability. Cowan v. Kerford Quarry Co., 146 Kan. 682, 72 P.2d 299 (1937).

81. Total permanent disability determined in accordance with the facts, when; last sentence of subsection (3)(a) construed. Justice v. Continental Can Co., 174 Kan. 539, 544, 257 P.2d 564 (1953).

82. Award of compensation to extend longer than eight years from date of injury improper. Magers v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 193 Kan. 137, 140, 392 P.2d 148 (1964).

—Temporary total disability (83-87)

83. Foot and leg injury; computation for temporary total followed by permanent partial disability. Hering v. San Ore Construction Co., 130 Kan. 70, 71, 285 P. 592 (1930).

84. Scheduled injuries apply where disability is permanent, and not where it is temporary only; temporary total disability only is provided for in this subsection (3)(b). Blythe v. State Highway Comm., 148 Kan. 598, 600, 83 P.2d 678 (1938).

85. Temporary total disability compensable and subsequent thereto compensation for scheduled injury; not "pyramiding of compensation"; cases reviewed. Chamberlain v. Bowersock Mills and Power Co., 150 Kan. 934, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 96 P.2d 684 (1939).

86. Clause in subsection 23 on "no additional compensation" does not forbid award for temporary total disability arising out of same accident as scheduled injury. Chamberlain v. Bowersock Mills and Power Co., 150 Kan. 934, 944, 96 P.2d 684 (1939).

87. Error to allow both temporary total disability and scheduled disability for same injury. Dunlap v. Crown Drug Co., 185 Kan. 494, 498, 345 P.2d 657 (1959); rehearing, 186 Kan. 5, 348 P.2d 609 (1960).

SCHEDULED DISABILITY

—Loss of extremities (88-99)

88. Partial loss of hand from injury in breadmoulding machine; injury is covered by clause (3)(c)(21), not covered by schedule. Emry v. Cripes, 110 Kan. 693, 695, 205 P. 598 (1922).

89. Workman had distal phalange amputated, causing disability to hand; scheduled compensation, plus permanent partial allowed. Sims v. Consumers Bread Co., 125 Kan. 747, 748, 265 P. 1114 (1928).

90. Injury to arm and fracture of clavicle; error to allow only scheduled compensation for arm; should be either scheduled amount plus additional for shoulder or general disability dispensing with schedule. Bray v. Carrothers Construction Co., 131 Kan. 766, 769, 293 P. 504 (1930).

91. Injury to both feet should be compensated as temporary or permanent disability not provided for by schedule; not proper to compensate each foot separately. Honn v. Elliott, 132 Kan. 454, 458, 295 P. 719 (1931).

92. Schedule allowance for fingers exclusive; that fingers impair use of hand does not authorize compensation for hand. Gallivan v. Swift & Co., 136 Kan. 234, 236, 14 P.2d 665 (1932).

93. Injury to shoulder and clavicle with radial nerve remaining damaged; held to be scheduled injury to arm. Smythe v. Western Star Milling Co., 136 Kan. 416, 417, 15 P.2d 419 (1932).

94. Evidence sufficient to sustain amount of award as a scheduled loss of foot injury. Johnson v. Arma Elevator Co., 146 Kan. 965, 73 P.2d 1018 (1937).

95. Loss of first phalange; test; substantial loss must be shown. Decicco v. John Morrell & Co., 152 Kan. 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 106 P.2d 1053 (1940).

96. Loss of four fingers and first phalange of thumb, complications with thumb and hand; recovery limited to 145.2 weeks although workman totally disabled for two years. Amos v. J. E. Trigg Drilling Co., 153 Kan. 617, 618, 621, 113 P.2d 107 (1941).

97. Loss of two thumbs constitutes two scheduled injuries compensable exclusively as such. Wammack v. Root Manufacturing Co., 184 Kan. 367, 373, 336 P.2d 441 (1959).

98. An award for temporary total loss of use of a scheduled member is not subject to review and modification. Applehans v. Butner, 193 Kan. 658, 659, 660, 396 P.2d 355 (1964).

99. Scheduled award under subsection (3)(c)(14) runs in addition to temporary total award under subsection (3)(c)(21). Cramer v. Blankenship Painting & Decorating Co., 202 Kan. 531, 536, 537, 449 P.2d 555 (1969).

—Loss of eye (100-105)

100. Total loss of one eye; sympathetic affliction to other eye not compensable. Schweiger v. Sheridan Coal Co., 132 Kan. 798, 802, 297 P. 688 (1931).

101. Loss of eye; compensation not reduced because of prior injury to eye for which compensation paid; provision is for loss of an eye; not for loss of a perfect eye. Justice v. A. C. Flour Mills Co., 147 Kan. 402, 404, 76 P.2d 402 (1938).

102. Loss of vision should be computed without aid of corrective lens. McCullough v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 155 Kan. 629, 631, 632, 634, 127 P.2d 467 (1942).

103. Loss of a totally sightless eye is compensable. Hemphill v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 174 Kan. 301, 304, 255 P.2d 624 (1953).

104. Rules and regulations of director construed as to computing percentage loss of vision. Piper v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 200 Kan. 438, 443, 436 P.2d 396 (1968).

105. Subsection (3)(c)(17) and (21) considered; loss of visual acuity not provided for in schedule of specific injuries. Piper v. Kansas Turnpike Authority 202 Kan. 771, 775, 451 P.2d 152 (1969).

—Loss of use (106-121)

106. Injury to feet by 40 foot fall; no general bodily compensation allowed. Orendoc v. Kaw Steel Construction Co., 131 Kan. 366, 369, 291 P. 952 (1930).

107. Partial loss of use of leg; the time over which payment (not the amount of each payment) is reduced proportionate to percent of disability. Paul v. Skelly Oil Co., 134 Kan. 636, 639, 7 P.2d 73 (1932).

108. Court must find percent of loss of use of leg where partial disability thereof is found; necessary to computation of compensation. Norman v. Consolidated Cement Co., 134 Kan. 823, 826, 8 P.2d 401 (1932).

109. "Pyramiding" of compensation defined and disapproved. Thompson v. General Machine & Tool Co., 135 Kan. 705, 708, 11 P.2d 685 (1932).

110. Temporary total disability to finger followed by permanent partial compensated as scheduled injury. Gallagher v. Menges & Mange Const. Co., 146 Kan. 506, 509, 72 P.2d 79 (1937).

111. Scheduled compensation should not be decreased by use of artificial limb, brace or appliance. McCullough v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 155 Kan. 629, 633, 127 P.2d 467 (1942).

112. Permanent partial loss of the use of members or organs listed in our act are compensable as scheduled injuries. Stanley v. United Iron Works Co., 160 Kan. 243, 253, 160 P.2d 708 (1945).

113. Method of computation of compensation for partial loss of hearing of both ears described and approved. Stanley v. United Iron Works Co., 160 Kan. 243, 256, 257, 160 P.2d 708 (1945).

114. Holding in this case that loss of use of leg is not a scheduled injury overruled in Stanley v. United Iron Works Co., 160 Kan. 243, 253. Consolidated Cement Co. v. Baker, 129 Kan. 845, 847, 284 P. 415 (1930).

115. Twenty-five percent loss of use of wrist and arm found to have resulted from tar burns. Harris v. Bechtel-Dempsey-Price, 160 Kan. 560, 564, 164 P.2d 89 (1945).

116. Permanent partial loss of hearing is compensable as scheduled injury. Meredith v. Shawver Graham, Inc., 171 Kan. 513, 519, 233 P.2d 750 (1951).

117. Director's rule for computation of compensation (51-7-9) approved; not "pyramiding." Rhea v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 176 Kan. 674, 676, 679, 272 P.2d 741 (1954).

118. Temporary total followed by permanent partial loss of use of foot; formula for computation of award approved. Rhea v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 176 Kan. 674, 676, 272 P.2d 741 (1954).

119. Rules and regulations of director construed as to computing percentage loss of vision. Piper v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 200 Kan. 438, 443, 436 P.2d 396 (1968).

120. Scheduled award under subsection (3)(c)(14) runs in addition to temporary total award under subsection (3)(c)(21). Cramer v. Blankenship Painting & Decorating Co., 202 Kan. 531, 536, 537, 449 P.2d 555 (1969).

121. Subsection (3)(c)(17) and (21) considered; loss of visual acuity not provided for in schedule of specific injuries. Piper v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 202 Kan. 771, 775, 451 P.2d 152 (1969).

—Hernia (122-125)

122. Evidence sufficient to show double hernia with aggravation of arthritis; temporary total followed by permanent partial disability. Potocan v. Hamilton Coal and Mercantile Co., 120 Kan. 326, 328, 243 P. 537 (1926).

123. Workman suffering double hernia entitled to compensation for each and also, possibly for healing period. Rogers v. Board of Public Utilities, 158 Kan. 693, 698, 149 P.2d 632 (1944).

124. Operable hernia is scheduled injury within (3)(c)(22); no compensation under (3)(c)(24) is allowable. Bowman v. Bushman Construction Co., 183 Kan. 671, 675, 331 P.2d 883 (1958).

125. Subsection (3)(c)(22) considered in determining reasonableness of refusing medical treatment. Morgan v. Sholom Drilling Co., 199 Kan. 156, 161, 427 P.2d 448 (1967).

NON-SCHEDULED DISABILITY

—Criterion of disability (126-131)

126. Injury is not test of compensability, but substantial impairment of workman's effectiveness, resulting from injury. Reese v. Armour & Co., 120 Kan. 56, 57, 242 P. 147 (1926).

127. Wages subsequent to scheduled injury are not to reduce compensation. Smythe v. Western Star Milling Co., 136 Kan. 416, 418, 15 P.2d 419 (1932).

128. Fact claimant working at increased wages does not prevent partial permanent disability finding; wages are only one indication of earning power. McGhee v. Sinclair Refining Co., 146 Kan. 653, 659, 73 P.2d 39 (1937).

129. "Disability" as used in subsection (3)(c)(24) is the inability of the workman to perform work he was able to perform prior to his injury.

(a) Beal v. El Dorado Refining Co., 132 Kan. 666, 672, 296 P. 723 (1931);

(b) McGhee v. Sinclair Refining Co., 146 Kan. 653, 659, 73 P.2d 39 (1937);

(c) Rupp v. Jacobs, 149 Kan. 712, 717, 88 P.2d 1102 (1939);

(d) Davis v. Braun, 170 Kan. 177, 183, 223 P.2d 958 (1950);

(e) Daugherty v. National Gypsum Co., 182 Kan. 197, 202, 318 P.2d 1012 (1957).

130. The criterion for compensation under the act, and particularly (3)(c)(24) is disability of the workman; loss of earning power is the theoretical basis for allowance of compensation; "disability" defined. Daugherty v. National Gypsum Co., 182 Kan. 197, 202, 318 P.2d 1012 (1957).

131. Loss of earning power may result from ineligibility to obtain work as well as from inability to perform procurable work due to impairment of physical fitness; wages paid do not establish ability to earn.

(a) Gorrell v. Battelle, 93 Kan. 370, 144 P. 244 (1914);

(b) Gailey v. Manufacturing Co., 98 Kan. 53, 157 P. 431 (1916);

(c) Sauvain v. Battelle, 100 Kan. 468, 164 P. 1086 (1917);

(d) Raffaghelle v. Russell, 103 Kan. 849, 176 P. 640 (1918);

(e) Quillen v. Wichita Gas Co., 128 Kan. 9, 275 P. 1075 (1929);

(f) Harvey v. Eldridge & Majors Packing Co., 128 Kan. 403, 278 P. 16 (1929);

(g) Beal v. El Dorado Refining Co., 132 Kan. 666, 672, 296 P. 723 (1931);

(h) McGhee v. Sinclair Refining Co., 146 Kan. 653, 659, 73 P.2d 39 (1937);

(i) Davis v. Braun, 170 Kan. 177, 183, 223 P.2d 958 (1950);

(j) Daugherty v. National Gypsum Co., 182 Kan. 197, 202, 318 P.2d 1012 (1957);

(k) Subsection (3)(c)(24) construed; workman to be compensated for loss of earning capacity; test for determining loss of earning capacity. Puckett v. Minter Drilling Co., 196 Kan. 196, 199, 200, 410 P.2d 414 (1966);

(l) Permanent partial disability rating determined; determination of loss of earning capacity; court may consider both expert and lay testimony. Mooney v. Harrison, 199 Kan. 162, 166, 427 P.2d 457 (1967);

(m) Criterion for compensation is inability of workman to perform work he was able to perform prior to injury. Gray v. Beller, 199 Kan. 284, 288, 428 P.2d 833 (1967).

—Computation of disability (132-136)

132. Act of 1913; it is not easy to determine the wage that the injured employee will be able to earn after the accident. Roberts v. Packing Co., 95 Kan. 723, 730, 149 P. 413 (1915).

133. Act of 1913 basis for estimating probable future earnings considered. Sauvain v. Battelle, 100 Kan. 468, 471, 164 P. 1086 (1917).

134. Computation of compensation due under Proviso 13†; fifteen percent disability and $90 per week wage before injury; fifteen percent of sixty percent of $90 for 415 weeks. Davis v. Braun, 170 Kan. 177, 181, 182, 223 P.2d 958 (1950).

135. Subsection (3)(c)(24) discussed with respect to using wages earned after injury in calculating claimant's average weekly wage. Casebeer v. Casebeer, 199 Kan. 806, 813, 433 P.2d 399 (1967).

136. Distinction made between accidental injury resulting in disability and occupational disease, with respect to computing weekly rate of compensation. Knight v. Hudiburg-Smith Chevrolet, Olds, Inc., 200 Kan. 205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 435 P.2d 3 (1967).

—Combinations of injuries (137-146)

137. If disability besides that occasioned by simple loss of the member itself results from an injury, compensation may be allowed for the additional disability. Sims v. Consumers Bread Co., 125 Kan. 747, 748, 265 P. 1114 (1928).

138. Recovery for scheduled injury does not prevent recovery for disfigurement. Beal v. El Dorado Refining Co., 132 Kan. 666, 674, 675, 296 P. 723 (1931).

139. Recovery had for scheduled injury to sight and hearing; also compensation allowed for disfigurement preventing securing of work. Beal v. El Dorado Refining Co., 132 Kan. 666, 674, 675, 296 P. 723 (1931).

140. Both scheduled and unscheduled injuries resulting from an accident may be considered together and different standards of compensation applied. Thompson v. General Machine & Tool Co., 135 Kan. 705, 707, 11 P.2d 685 (1932).

141. Combination of scheduled and unscheduled injuries; computation. Thompson v. General Machine & Tool Co., 135 Kan. 705, 708, 11 P.2d 685 (1932).

142. Fractured skull and brain concussion compensated as scheduled injury to eye and ears; upheld. Stanley v. United Iron Works Co., 160 Kan. 243, 244, 251, 252, 254, 256, 160 P.2d 708 (1945).

143. Statute does not restrict compensation to a single consequence or condition which results from the injury. Stanley v. United Iron Works Co., 160 Kan. 243, 254, 160 P.2d 708 (1945).

144. Loss of eye coupled with previous disability held total and permanent disability under (3)(c)(24). Polston v. Ready Made Homes, 171 Kan. 336, 337, 338, 340, 342, 232 P.2d 446 (1951).

145. Eyes; impairment of the coordinate function of both eyes; permanent partial disability. Justice v. Continental Can Co., 174 Kan. 539, 544, 257 P.2d 564 (1953).

146. Argument rejected that fractured femur which would not heal, would produce arthritis of the head of the femur thus entitling the workman to general disability; scheduled compensation allowed. Peterson v. Hill Packing Co., 178 Kan. 697, 290 P.2d 822 (1955).

—Traumatic neurosis (147-152)

147. Traumatic neurosis long has been recognized as being compensable; law reviewed. Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 Kan. 790, 792, 62 P.2d 920 (1936).

148. Scheduled injury followed by traumatic neurosis; compensation for temporary total disability not to exceed 415 weeks proper. Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 Kan. 790, 792, 62 P.2d 920 (1936).

149. Total permanent disability allowed for injury to back and aggravation of mental affliction. Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 365, 366, 139 P.2d 846 (1943).

150. Cases in which there are two separate and distinct injuries distinguished from referred pain type cases. Riggan v. Coleman Co., 166 Kan. 234, 237, 238, 200 P.2d 271 (1948).

151. Scheduled injury; compensation also allowed for "traumatic hysteria." Miller v. Massman Construction Co., 169 Kan. 499, 504, 219 P.2d 429 (1950).

152. Conversion hysteria (traumatic neurosis) held compensable even if financial, marital and other worries play a part; permanent total disability. Barr v. Builders, Inc., 179 Kan. 617, 620, 627, 296 P.2d 1106 (1956). Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 Kan. 790, 792, 793, 62 P.2d 920 (1936).

—Back injuries (153-155)

153. Back injury observable by X-ray was ascertainable by objective observation; temporary total and permanent partial allowed in lump sum proper. Davis v. Hibbens, 113 Kan. 121, 123, 213 P. 661 (1923).

154. Leg injury resulted in tilted pelvis and curvature of spine preventing manual labor; 60% permanent disability approved. Fernandez v. Edgar Zinc Co., 138 Kan. 735, 736, 737, 27 P.2d 239 (1933).

155. Twenty-five percent permanent disability allowed for herniated intervertebral disc, with spinal nerve involvement causing nerve root compression affecting leg. Daugherty v. National Gypsum Co., 182 Kan. 197, 200, 204, 318 P.2d 1012 (1957).

—Indefinite duration (156-160)

156. Minimum for temporary total disability allowed "until further order," not to exceed 415 weeks; see provisos 8 and 9. Pegg v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 129 Kan. 413, 416, 417, 283 P. 58 (1929).

157. Evidence held sufficient to establish total disability of problematical duration. Hardwell v. St. Louis S. & R. Co., 146 Kan. 870, 876, 73 P.2d 1120 (1937).

158. Compensation should cease when incapacity ends; pain not resulting in incapacity is not compensable. Dobson v. Apex Coal Co., 150 Kan. 80, 86, 91 P.2d 5 (1939).

159. Compensation for original scheduled injury does not bar recovery for indefinite continuing total disability, when; not pyramiding of compensation. Richards v. J-M Service Corp., 164 Kan. 316, 321, 322, 188 P.2d 939 (1948).

160. Failure to pay medical expenses when due; entire award collectible as lump sum, including award for an indefinite period of time. Owen v. Ready Made Buildings, Inc., 180 Kan. 286, 290, 303 P.2d 168 (1956).

MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

—Additional compensation (161-165)

161. Scheduled injury; compensation during healing period; additional compensation not allowable. Amos v. J. E. Trigg Drilling Co., 153 Kan. 617, 618, 619, 621, 622, 113 P.2d 107 (1941).

162. Allowance for specific scheduled injury precludes allowance for temporary incapacity beyond healing period. Riggan v. Coleman Co., 166 Kan. 234, 235, 236, 237, 200 P.2d 271 (1948).

163. Hand crushed in machine; scheduled injury under (3)(c)(21); causalgia (or referred pain) to head, neck and shoulder not compensable because of limitation of (3)(c)(23); healing period allowed. Riggan v. Coleman Co., 166 Kan. 234, 237, 238, 200 P.2d 271 (1948).

164. Amputation of lower leg; compensation under schedule, plus healing period allowed in accord with wording of workman's claim; no proof of bodily disability; permanent partial disability disapproved on appeal. McKinney v. Rodney Milling Co., 177 Kan. 401, 402, 403, 404, 279 P.2d 221 (1955).

165. Subsection (3)(c)(23) not applicable where compensable injury to part of body not specifically scheduled. Jackson v. Stevens Well Service, 208 Kan. 637, 640, 641, 643, 493 P.2d 264.

—Independent cause of death (166-167)

166. Death by independent cause stops installments of compensation not yet due. Jackovich v. Armour & Co., 132 Kan. 656, 660, 296 P. 708 (1931).

167. Payments not yet due abrogated by workman's death from other causes; subsection (25) (formerly 23) construed. Lawrence v. Natural Gas Pipe Line Co., 152 Kan. 558, 559, 560, 561, 106 P.2d 685 (1940).

—Previous disability (168-175)

168. Compensation not reduced because of previous injury when it was not compensated and did not prevent work. Moore v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 124 Kan. 214, 215, 216, 257 P. 724 (1927).

169. Subsection (3)(c)(26) is operative only in cases where the first or prior injury has some causal connection with the total disability resulting from the second injury. Conner v. M & M Packing Co., 166 Kan. 98, 103, 199 P.2d 458 (1948).

170. Second injury causing total disability; first or prior injury not considered in determining compensation, when. Conner v. M & M Packing Co., 166 Kan. 98, 103, 199 P.2d 458 (1948).

171. Loss of eye; compensation not reduced because of prior injury to eye for which compensation was paid. Marquiss v. Bilwil Mining Co., 166 Kan. 420, 423, 202 P.2d 194 (1949).

172. Application of second injury fund law to loss of second eye resulting in total permanent disability ordered. Justice v. Continental Can Co., 174 Kan. 539, 550, 551, 257 P.2d 564 (1953).

173. Prior back injury; previous disability not considered in determining compensation payable. Cody v. Lewis & West Transit Mix, 186 Kan. 437, 440, 441, 442, 351 P.2d 4 (1960).

174. Contemplates previous scheduled injury which with present injury results in total disability. Poehlman v. Leydig, 194 Kan. 649, 652, 654, 400 P.2d 724 (1965).

175. Subsection (3)(c)(26) discussed; claimant sustained total permanent disability because of loss of vision. Piper v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 202 Kan. 771, 775, 776, 777, 779, 451 P.2d 152 (1969).

—Maximum time of coverage (176)

176. The number of weeks of total disability plus the number of weeks of partial disability cannot exceed 415 weeks. Billings v. United Power & Light Corp., 125 Kan. 370, 374, 263 P. 779 (1928).

—Exclusive remedy (177-179)

177. Minor employed by parent in covered employment is within act. Dressler v. Dressler, 167 Kan. 749, 208 P.2d 271 (1949).

178. Workmen's compensation act not exclusive remedy for thirteen-year-old employee, when. Hadley v. Security Elevator Co., 175 Kan. 395, 397, 264 P.2d 1076 (1953).

179. Minor workman's death resulted from injury; wrongful death action barred by subsection (3)(c)(28). Neville, Administratix v. Wichita Eagle, 179 Kan. 197, 200, 294 P.2d 248 (1956).

—Construction and procedure (180-189)

180. Limitations on amount of recovery are fixed by this section. Roberts v. Packing Co., 95 Kan. 723, 731, 149 P. 413 (1915).

181. Structure of section and interrelation of parts considered and discussed; section applied and computation made; method of computation overruled in later cases. Stefan v. Elevator Co., 106 Kan. 369, 371, 372, 373, 187 P. 861 (1920).

182. The 1927 act was a comprehensive one to cover whole field of compensation, including amount due as compensation; no interest on deferred payments. Richardson v. National Refining Co., 137 Kan. 473, 474, 21 P.2d 307 (1933).

183. Unappealed finding of commissioner conclusive as to character of injury. Cornell v. Cities Service Gas Co., 138 Kan. 607, 27 P.2d 228 (1933).

184. Mentioned; workman may recover compensation and also damages from third party. Clifford v. Eacrett, 163 Kan. 471, 476, 479, 480, 486, 183 P.2d 861 (1947).

185. Chiropractor can not file claim when neither workman nor his representative, nor employee has made a filing. Grantham v. Coleman Co., 190 Kan. 468, 469, 470, 375 P.2d 629 (1962); rehearing denied, 190 Kan. 634, 376 P.2d 908 (1963).

186. Employee's doctor cannot institute claim for services before director where no proceeding pending. Grantham v. Coleman Co., 190 Kan. 468, 375 P.2d 629 (1962); rehearing denied, 190 Kan. 634, 376 P.2d 908 (1963).

187. Where amendment of statute changes substantive rights, a retrospective application is not to be given; consideration of impairment of vested rights. Johnson v. Warren, 192 Kan. 310, 314, 387 P.2d 213 (1963).

188. Disability based on recurrence of dermatitis after medical aid; claim barred under K.S.A. 44-5a16. Bayless v. List & Clark Construction Co., 201 Kan. 572, 574, 577, 441 P.2d 841 (1968).

189. When primary injury arises out of employment, every natural consequence flowing therefrom is compensable. Jackson v. Stevens Well Service, 208 Kan. 637, 640, 641, 643, 493 P.2d 264 (1972).

—Amount of award (190-195)

190. Whether refusal to submit to operation is unreasonable is a question of fact. Everitt v. Haldeman-Julius Pub. Co., 124 Kan. 115, 118, 257 P. 939 (1927).

191. Because of the entirety of total disability, total and partial disability cannot coexist; during the period of total disability there is no partial disability for which compensation may be made. Billings v. United Power & Light Corp., 125 Kan. 370, 374, 263 P. 779 (1928).

192. Unreasonable offers of surgical operations discussed. Grigliono v. Hope Coal Co., 125 Kan. 581, 583, 584, 264 P. 1051 (1928).

193. Unreasonable refusal of surgical operation justified denial of compensation. Gentry v. Williams Brothers, 135 Kan. 408, 409, 10 P.2d 856 (1932).

194. August 10 to December 3 is a total of 115 days; for compensatory purposes the first week being omitted this is fifteen weeks and three days. Bowman v. Bushman Construction Co., 183 Kan. 671, 675, 331 P.2d 883 (1958).

195. Allowance of medical expense is not inherently a finding of disability; finding of no disability upheld. Howerton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 Kan. 449, 451, 452, 381 P.2d 365 (1963).

—Evidence, duration of disability (196-203)

196. The duration of an injured workman's incapacity is a question of fact; direct and circumstantial evidence is sufficient; need not be established by direct positive testimony. Cowan v. Kerford Quarry Co., 146 Kan. 682, 685, 72 P.2d 999 (1937).

197. Duration of disability need not be proved by medical testimony. Hardwell v. St. Louis S. & R. Co., 146 Kan. 870, 876, 73 P.2d 1120 (1937).

198. Medical testimony not essential to prove duration of disability or incapacity of workman. Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618, 627, 106 P.2d 690 (1940).

199. Not essential that duration of disability be established by medical testimony. Copenhaver v. Sykes, 160 Kan. 238, 242, 160 P.2d 235 (1945).

200. Testimony of doctor that workman would be totally disabled for one hundred weeks; that was sufficient to sustain award. Hardin v. Beck Mining Co., 166 Kan. 95, 97, 199 P.2d 186 (1948).

201. Duration of disability is a question of fact. Hardin v. Beck Mining Co., 166 Kan. 95, 97, 199 P.2d 186 (1948).

202. Medical testimony not essential to establish duration of disability or incapacity; sufficiency of evidence; unsupported statements by claimant as to disability are substantial evidence and sufficient to support judgment on appeal. Conner v. M & M Packing Co., 166 Kan. 98, 100, 103, 199 P.2d 458 (1948).

203. The existence, the extent and the duration of an injured workman's incapacity is a question of fact for the trial court to determine.

(a) Daugherty v. National Gypsum Co., 182 Kan. 197, 204, 318 P.2d 1012 (1957);

(b) Smith v. Jones, 185 Kan. 505, 507, 508, 345 P.2d 640 (1959);

(c) Cody v. Lewis & West Transit Mix, 186 Kan. 437, 351 P.2d 4 (1960);

(d) Shepherd v. Gas Service Co., 186 Kan. 699, 352 P.2d 48 (1960);

(e) Howerton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 Kan. 449, 451, 381 P.2d 365 (1963).

—Evidence, other proof (204-208)

204. Testimony of persons that they could not give claimant employment is incompetent to prove what claimant can earn; testimony of persons of positions claimant could fill is competent. Sims v. Construction Co., 111 Kan. 179, 182, 206 P. 878 (1922).

205. Evidence of extent of disability considered; objective symptoms and subjective symptoms distinguished. Reeder v. Thompson, 120 Kan. 722, 723, 245 P. 127 (1926).

206. Proof of minimum disability necessary. Conner v. Base Line Coal Co., 130 Kan. 504, 506, 287 P. 585 (1930).

207. On review of award, court placed burden of proof on claimant to show what partial disability was; evidence lacking, award reduced. Davis v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 137 Kan. 30, 33, 34, 19 P.2d 733 (1933).

208. In finding disability, court is not limited by the medical evidence; court may consider the testimony of the claimant.

(a) Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618, 106 P.2d 690 (1940);

(b) Copenhaver v. Sykes, 160 Kan. 238, 160 P.2d 235 (1945);

(c) Conner v. M & M Packing Co., 166 Kan. 98, 199 P.2d 458 (1948);

(d) Polston v. Ready Made Homes, 171 Kan. 336, 337, 338, 340, 342, 232 P.2d 446 (1951).

—Restitution (209)

209. Subsection (2) mentioned in holding act makes no provision for restitution or "recover back" of payments made pending appeal. Tompkins v. Rinner Construction Co., 196 Kan. 244, 245, 247, 409 P.2d 1001 (1966).

OLD CASES (largely outdated) (210-211)

210. Rule of all old cases following Stefan v. Elevator Co., 106 Kan. 369, held to be reversed by amendments in 1927; scheduled compensation only to be allowed for scheduled injuries. Neuhause v. Hope Engineering Co., 132 Kan. 72, 73, 74, 75, 294 P. 655 (1931).

211. List of largely outdated cases:

(a) Snopkoski v. Home Riverside Coal Mines Co., 120 Kan. 747, 244 P. 849 (1926);

(b) McKarnin v. Armour & Co., 118 Kan. 738, 236 P. 837 (1925);

(c) Lane v. Sonken-Galamba Corporation, 119 Kan. 256, 237 P. 875 (1925);

(d) Smith v. Packing Co., 115 Kan. 874, 225 P. 110 (1924);

(e) Turman v. Process Co., 114 Kan. 693, 220 P. 510 (1923);

(f) Shmana v. Swift & Co., 113 Kan. 340, 214 P. 567 (1923);

(g) Hiatt v. Ulrich, 111 Kan. 643, 208 P. 559 (1922);

(h) Cooper v. Construction Co., 111 Kan. 391, 207 P. 798 (1922);

(i) Anderson v. Oil & Refining Co., 111 Kan. 314, 206 P. 900 (1922);

(j) Gilmore v. Mining Co., 111 Kan. 158, 205 P. 1018 (1922);

(k) Hood v. Transit Co., 106 Kan. 76, 186 P. 977 (1920);

(l) Close v. Mining Co., 105 Kan. 257, 182 P. 392 (1919);

(m) Galemore v. Cement Co., 103 Kan. 336, 173 P. 913 (1918);

(n) Seckman v. Cement Co., 100 Kan. 463, 165 P. 278 (1917).

Cases after 1973

212. Exclusionary clause in insurance policy excluding injuries or sickness covered by act construed. St. Francis Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc. v. Eckman, 212 Kan. 131, 132, 510 P.2d 175.

213. Claim for medical services of unlicensed practitioner disallowed; K.S.A. 44-508b applied. Buck v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 215 Kan. 157, 162, 163, 523 P.2d 697.

214. Applied; direction to limit medical expenses to maximum statutory amount. Bergemann v. North Central Foundry, Inc., 215 Kan. 685, 690, 527 P.2d 1044.

215. Applied; functional disability as test for determining award for permanent partial disability (dissenting opinion.) Anderson v. Kinsley Sand & Gravel, Inc., 221 Kan. 191, 199, 558 P.2d 146.

216. Referred to in holding K.S.A. 44-510e applicable to compensation rates for occupational diseases. Schubert v. Peerless Products, Inc., 223 Kan. 288, 291, 573 P.2d 1009.

217. Former provisions of section referred to in construing K.S.A. 44-510b; surviving legal spouse entitled to benefits without dependency proof. Brinkmeyer v. City of Wichita, 223 Kan. 393, 394, 395, 573 P.2d 1044.

218. Denial of provision for future medical expenses error. Ferrell v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 223 Kan. 421, 423, 573 P.2d 1065.

219. Mentioned in authorizing retroactive payment for past medical expenses due to recurrence of medical condition. Morris v. Kansas City Bd. of Public Util., 3 Kan. App. 2d 527, 533, 598 P.2d 544.

220. Mentioned in holding trial court correctly awarded compensation for past medical expenses. Morgan v. Inter-Collegiate Press, 4 Kan. App. 2d 319, 322, 606 P.2d 479.

221. Award of partial disability following rehabilitation program must reflect extent worker's ability to perform work of same type and character being done when injured has been reduced. Antwi v. C-E Industrial Group, 5 Kan. App. 2d 53, 61, 612 P.2d 656.

222. Absent express statutory authority, administrative agency cannot award compensatory or punitive damages. Woods v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 231 Kan. 763, 773, 648 P.2d 234 (1982).

223. Compensation received under K.S.A. 44-510g is included in computing total compensation due under K.S.A. 44-510d. Cowan v. Josten's American Yearbook Co., 8 Kan. App. 2d 423, 427, 660 P.2d 78 (1983).

224. Where employer brings money suit, worker cannot claim offsets alleged due under act when provisions not utilized. Bethany Medical Center v. Knox, 10 Kan. App. 2d 192, 194, 196, 694 P.2d 1331 (1985).

225. Where judgment final, act gives jurisdiction to director to authorize a change of treating physicians. Dinkel v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 10 Kan. App. 2d 604, 606, 706 P.d 470 (1985).

226. Hospitalizaton and treatment for overdose of medication prescribed for covered injury not ordinary and necessary result of injury. Carr v. Unit No. 8169, 237 Kan. 660, 666, 703 P.2d 751 (1985).

227. Employer liable only for statutory amount for unauthorized physician (c); neglect to provide same permits claimant to select. Houston v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 238 Kan. 192, 198, 199, 708 P.2d 533 (1985).

228. Subsection (c) permits employee dissatisfied with approved physician to ask for new one or select his own. Murphy v. IBP, Inc., 240 Kan. 141, 148, 727 P.2d 468 (1986).

229. Cited; discharge for absence due to work-related injury held retaliatory; tort action independent of collective bargaining agreement. Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 805, 752 P.2d 645 (1988).

230. Reduction in compensation for later injury not as inapplicable to temporary total disability and medical treatment (K.S.A. 44-510a(a)). Miner v. M. Bruenger & Co., Inc., 17 Kan. App. 2d 185, 836 P.2d 19 (1992).

231. Limitation on remedies examined when employee has no spouse, children or dependents. Karhoff v. National Mills, Inc., 18 Kan. App. 2d 302, 305, 851 P.2d 1021 (1993).

232. Whether vocational rehabilitation vendor costs are compensation and recoverable by claimant in employer subrogation cases examined. Varner v. Gulf Ins. Co., 18 Kan. App. 2d 801, 802, 859 P.2d 414 (1993).

233. Cited; whether employer's estimate that gross annual payroll would not exceed $10,000 for coverage purposes was reasonable examined. Fetzer v. Boling, 19 Kan. App. 2d 264, 266, 867 P.2d 1067 (1994).

234. Where injury does not disable employee for at least one week workers compensation benefits are limited to medical expenses. Boucher v. Peerless Products, Inc., 21 Kan. App. 2d 977, 983, 911 P.2d 198 (1996).

235. When employee's procurement of personal physician tolls statute of limitations for workers compensation claim discussed. Lawrence v. Cobler, 22 Kan. App. 2d 291, 295, 915 P.2d 157 (1996).

236. Change in disability of worker is not required for an award to be modified under subsection (a). Garrison v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 23 Kan. App. 2d 221, 223, 929 P.2d 788 (1996).

237. Reimbursement for unnecessary medical expenses; peer utilization review procedure hereunder not available; adoption of procedures required. Beisel v. Boeing Co., 23 Kan. App. 2d 572, 574, 576, 932 P.2d 1050 (1997).

238. Section creates a narrow exception to the general rules of K.S.A. 44-519; an independent health care provider's opinion on issues beyond functional impairment without supporting testimony. Sims v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 23 Kan. App. 2d 591, 592, 933 P.2d 161 (1997).

239. Medical treatment under subsection (a) does not include costs associated with purchasing larger car to accommodate disability. Hedrick v. U.S.D. No. 259, 23 Kan. App. 2d 783, 935 P.2d 1083 (1997).

240. Workers Compensation Board holding that treatment by chiropractor was unauthorized is affirmed as supported by substantial competent evidence. Griffin v. Dale Willey Pontiac-Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc., 268 Kan. 33, 36, 991 P.2d 406 (1999).

241. When employee and employer are the same person, insurance carrier entitled to designate treatment provider. Matney v. Matney Chiropractic Clinic, 26 Kan. App. 2d 69, 72, 977 P.2d 962 (1999).

242. Employee who resigned awarded wage loss compensation; no requirement to always seek accommodated work from employer where claimant made good faith effort to find appropriate employment. Oliver v. Boeing Co., 26 Kan. App. 2d 74, 77, 977 P.2d 288 (1999).

243. Claimant not entitled to work disability in excess of functional impairment rating; wage loss resulted from termination for failure to disclose prior injury not from work-related injuries. Ramirez v. Excel Corp., 26 Kan. App. 2d 139, 142, 979 P.2d 1261 (1999).

244. Benefits limited to functional impairment rating; employer offered reasonable accommodations for claimant's physical problems and is not required to make unusual efforts to accommodate claimant's transportation problem, i.e., could only get to work for one shift. Swickard v. Meadowbrook Manor, 26 Kan. App. 2d 144, 148, 979 P.2d 1256 (1999).

245. Worker who made good faith effort to obtain employment entitled to 100% wage loss. Copeland v. Johnson Group, Inc., 26 Kan. App. 2d 803, 807, 995 P.2d 369 (1999).

246. Corporate employer allowed to designate treatment provider for injured employee who is also a stockholder. Matney v. Matney Chiropractic Clinic, 268 Kan. 336, 340, 995 P.2d 871 (2000).

247. Normal wear and tear of prosthesis is not a new accident; cost of replacement remains with original insurer. Solis v. Brookover Ranch Feedyard, Inc., 268 Kan. 750, 999 P.2d 921 (2000).

248. Remanded to board for determination whether independent expert may opine concerning causality. Shehane v. Station Casino, 27 Kan. App. 2d 257, 3 P.3d 551 (2000).

249. Where accommodated work offered and refused by worker because of transportation problems, statutory presumption of no work disability not invoked where employer contributed to worker's transportation problems or dealt in bad faith. Ford v. Landoll Corp., 28 Kan. App. 2d 1, 11 P.3d 59 (2000).

250. Simultaneous injuries to nonparallel limbs are to be compensated as two scheduled injuries, not as whole body permanent partial disability injuries. Pruter v. Larned State Hospital, 28 Kan. App. 2d 302, 16 P.3d 975 (2000).

251. Simultaneous injuries to right arm and right leg are to be compensated as scheduled injuries rather than combined as whole body disability. Pruter v. Larned State Hospital, 271 Kan. 865, 26 P.3d 666 (2001).

252. Psychological injuries are compensable when directly related to compensable injury (post-traumatic stress disorder). Helmstetter v. Midwest Grain Products, Inc., 29 Kan. App. 2d 278, 28 P.3d 398 (2001).

253. Claimant may obtain a functional impairment rating from examining doctor when claimant pays for such rating separately from examination paid by the employer. Castro v. IBP, Inc., 29 Kan. App. 2d 475, 30 P.3d 1033 (2001).

254. After being terminated by employer on whose premises injury occurred, claimant's quitting a job for good cause at second employer for reasons unrelated to injury (sexual harassment) does not constitute bad faith in seeking employment. Cavender v. PIP Printing, Inc., 31 Kan. App. 2d 127, 61 P.3d 101 (2003).

255. Court sustains board in its findings of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment and permanent partial general disability. Chowning v. Cannon Valley Woodwork, Inc., 32 Kan. App. 2d 982, 93 P.3d 1210 (2004).

256. Injury from repetitive use of right shoulder while compensating for previously injured left shoulder is continuation of left shoulder injury. Casco v. Armour Swift-Echrich, 34 Kan. App. 2d 670, 128 P.3d 401 (2005).

257. Retirement benefits received reduce weekly rate under K.S.A. 44-501 but do not limit weeks payable for permanent total disability compensation under K.S.A. 44-510. McIntosh v. Sedgwick County, 34 Kan. App. 2d 684, 123 P.3d 740 (2005).

258. Claimant awarded permanent partial disability benefits even though he can earn comparable wage. Garcia v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 34 Kan. App. 2d 843, 125 P.3d 580 (2006).

259. Physician's opinion not necessary to support the existence of wage loss. Graham v. Dokter Trucking Group, 284 Kan. 547, 556, 161 P.3d 695 (2007).

260. Offset provisions discussed; lump sum payment of retirement benefits apportioned over remaining life expectancy. Lleras v. Via Christi Regional Med. Center, 37 Kan. App. 2d 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 154 P.3d 1130 (2007).

261. Workers compensation board's conclusion that K.S.A. 44-510 does not permit award of expert witness fees upheld. Higgins v. Abilene Machine, Inc., 38 Kan. App. 2d 735, 736, 737, 739, 740, 741, 172 P.3d 1201 (2007).

262. Workers compensation act requires compensation for each scheduled injury when multiple injuries occur within a single extremity. Mitchell v. Petsmart Inc., 291 Kan. 153, 239 P.3d 51 (2010).