Printable Format44-802. Definitions. The following terms, when used in this act, shall have the meaning ascribed to them in this section:
(1) The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
(2) The term "business agent" as used herein shall mean any authorized person, without regard to title, who is a full-time official of a labor organization and whose principal duties are to act or attempt to act for a labor organization in collective bargaining and other contract negotiations, in servicing existing contracts, or in organizing employees into collective bargaining units.
(3) The term "collective bargaining unit" shall mean all the employees of one employer which are employed within the state where a majority of whom have voted by secret ballot as provided and in accordance with rules set up in K.S.A. 44-816 to organize themselves into a collective bargaining unit, except that where a majority of the employees engaged in a single craft, division, department or plant shall have voted to constitute such group a separate bargaining unit they shall be so considered.
(4) The word "person" when used in this act shall mean and apply to every individual, association, partnership, corporation, employer, employee, collective bargaining unit, labor organization or business agent.
(5) The term "all-union agreement" shall mean an agreement between an employer and his employees or the duly authorized representative of his employees in a collective bargaining unit whereby all or any of the employees in such unit are required as a condition of continued employment to become or remain members of a single labor organization on or after the sixtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement whichever is the later.
History: L. 1943, ch. 191, § 1; L. 1955, ch. 252, § 1; L. 1974, ch. 207, § 2; July 1.
Law Review and Bar Journal References:
Cited in discussing right-to-work laws, Dan Hopson, Jr., 6 K.L.R. 1, 2 (1957); 8 K.L.R. 18, 22, 24, 76 (1959); Fred A. Beaty, 27 J.B.A.K. 348, 349 (1959).
Application to quasi-municipal corporation considered, opinion of attorney general, 4 K.L.R. 606 (1956).
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. Jurisdiction of state court to enjoin activities to compel agreement discussed. Asphalt Paving v. Local Union, 181 Kan. 775, 776, 783, 788, 789, 794, 317 P.2d 349.
2. No state jurisdiction where National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction; unfair labor practice, Local Lodge No. 774 v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 185 Kan. 183, 184, 341 P.2d 989.
3. First clause mentioned; K.S.A. 44-811 has no particular relation to mandamus. Topeka Bldg. & Construction Trades Council v. Leahy, 187 Kan. 112, 113, 353 P.2d 641.
4. Discussed; subsections 3, 12 and 13 of K.S.A. 44-809 held unconstitutional. Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 60.
5. Political subdivisions are not "employers" within meaning of statute. Wichita Public School Employees Union v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2, 5, 397 P.2d 357.
6. Act discussed in construing professional employees negotiation law (K.S.A. 72-5413 et seq.); school board required to negotiate with recognized representative until controversy determined. Liberal-NEA v. Board of Education, 211 Kan. 219, 224, 228, 505 P.2d 651.
7. Topeka Building and Construction Trades Council is "labor organization" hereunder; permissive intervention properly allowed. Andersen Construction Co. v. City of Topeka, 228 Kan. 73, 81, 82, 612 P.2d 595.